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Election 2008 - October 2008

How Obama and McCain Would Respond to Darfur

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DEVELOPMENTS

During the second Presidential Debate, moderator Tom Brokaw asked both candidates under what circumstances they would use  “United States combat forces in situations where there's a humanitarian crisis, but it does not affect our national security.”  The responses by Barack Obama and John McCain shed light on how each of them would respond to a conflict like Darfur.

The question was timely.  While international attention has been focused on other issues, the situation in Darfur has continued to deteriorate.  According to the UN, there are now just over 4.5 million conflict-affected people in Darfur, including 2.5 million who have been forced to flee their homes. Over 200,000 people have been displaced this year alone.  The past year has also seen a dramatic increase in attacks against aid agencies.   Since January 2008, eleven humanitarian staff members have been killed, 155 abducted (including WFP-contracted drivers), 208 vehicles hijacked and 22 convoys attacked.  These attacks make it increasingly difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach those most in need.  Over the summer, the UN estimated that it had access to only 70% of those affected by the conflict.

In response to the continued violence, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) recently requested an arrest warrant for the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, on the charges of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur. 

BACKGROUND

In May, both Barack Obama and John McCain signed a joint statement on Darfur, declaring that they “ stand united and demand that the genocide and violence in Darfur be brought to an end and that the CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] be fully implemented.”

Their responses during the second debate – as well as their previous statements regarding humanitarian crises – show there are both similarities and differences in how they would respond to Darfur.

Obama’s response to Brokaw’s question was telling.  He said:

"So when genocide is happening, when ethnic cleansing is happening somewhere around the world and we stand idly by, that diminishes us. And so I do believe that we have to consider it as part of our interests, our national interests, in intervening where possible. But understand that there's a lot of cruelty around the world. We're not going to be able to be everywhere all the time. That's why it's so important for us to be able to work in concert with our allies."

Though he spoke of both moral and real-politick interests, he did not advocate unilateral intervention.  As far back as 2004 Obama warned against putting US forces on the ground in Darfur, saying: “There is no question that the United States military is currently spread thin with our earlier commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Besides the importance of working with allies, he mentioned two steps he would take to address the conflict in Darfur.  First, providing logistical support to the existing UN peacekeeping force, and second imposing a no-fly zone.  In the past, he has also called for sanctions against Sudan’s leaders and oil industry.

In addition, he recently took a strong line against President Bush’s negotiations with Sudan to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. According to Obama: “This reckless and cynical initiative would reward a regime in Khartoum that has a record of failing to live up to its commitments.” He has also spoken in favor of divestment. 

Similarly, John McCain is also against a unilateral US intervention.  In response to Brokaw’s question, he said that "we must do whatever we can to prevent genocide", but then went on to say that this response "has to be tempered with our ability to beneficially affect the situation."

Judging by the examples he used – the US interventions in Lebanon in the early 1980s and Somalia in the early 1990s – it seems that Senator McCain would be very hesitant to support a direct US military intervention in humanitarian crises.

During the debate, however, McCain did not discuss what specific actions he would take.  To get a sense of how McCain might respond to Darfur, it's necessary to look at his statements over the past few years. In 2005, McCain wrote an opinion piece that called for financial sanctions against Sudanese Government leaders, a NATO-led no-fly zone, working with the Arab League to put pressure on Sudan, and the use of US and allied intelligence assets “to record any atrocities that occur in Darfur so that future prosecutions can take place.”

At a speech in December 2007, McCain called on the US to put pressure on China and suggested creating a “League of Democracies” to address the issue, without specifying what, exactly, the league would do. That same month he also mentioned the possibility of US troops offering logistical support for UN peacekeepers. Most recently in August 2008 he recommended imposing a no-fly zone. He has not brought up sanctions  or the use of US intelligence assets to “record” atrocities.

ANALYSIS


The question of how Obama and McCain would respond to Darfur is critical for a number of reasons.  First, on a moral level, their responses to Darfur are in effect a litmus test, on just what actions the United States would – and would not – take to prevent or respond to genocide.  The many similarities between their respective positions, and in particular the fact that neither advocates a unilateral US intervention, shows that there are real limits to how far the United States will go.

Second, on a practical level, their responses give a sense of what  a new administration would do to address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and Sudan more generally.  Finally, they also indicate how an Obama or a McCain Presidency would respond to the next humanitarian crisis that occurs. 

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Michael Kleinman is Foreign Policy Digest’s Regional Editor for Africa.

 

Iran and the Next Administration

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NYTimes
DEVELOPMENTS

Over the course of the Presidential campaign, John McCain and Barack Obama have clashed repeatedly over US policy toward Iran.  McCain has staked out a hawkish position in contrast to Obama's willingness to negotiate directly with the Iranian regime.  In practice, though, the two candidates' policies would likely be more similar to each other, and to the approach of the Bush administration, than campaign rhetoric would suggest.  A variety of factors will limit the next President's freedom of action and will make either a U.S.-Iranian military confrontation or a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough unlikely over the next four years.

 
Barack Obama has indicated his willingness to meet with Iranian leaders while criticizing the Bush administration’s reluctance to engage in direct diplomacy with Tehran.  At a Democratic primary debate in July 2007, Obama declared that he would be willing to meet with Iran’s leaders "without precondition" during the first term of his administration.  Although Obama later clarified his statement, explaining that lower-level talks would have to precede any meeting between himself and the Iranian leadership, he has stood by his determination to “engage in tough direct diplomacy with Iran.”  At his first debate with McCain, Obama declared that the Bush administration's failure to engage with the Iranians has "actually accelerated their efforts to get nuclear weapons."   Obama has argued that the United States must "show Iran -- and especially the Iranian people -- what could be gained from fundamental change: economic engagement, security assurances, and diplomatic relations."

 

John McCain has taken a much more hawkish stance toward Iran.  He has called Iran "the world's chief state sponsor of terrorism" and warned that nuclear weapons in Iranian hands would pose an "existential threat" to Israel that might lead to a "second Holocaust."  McCain stated that even if Iran did not attack Israel directly, Tehran could transfer nuclear weapons to one of its allied terrorist networks like Hezbollah.  McCain has attacked Obama's proposal to meet with Iranian leaders as dangerously naive.  He has also criticized Tehran's role in Iraq, including supplying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and training groups of insurgents.  In McCain’s view, the United States can shape Iranian behavior most effectively by putting economic, political, and military pressure on Tehran rather than through high-level negotiations.

 

The differences between the two candidates, however, may not be as dramatic as their rhetoric suggests.  Obama has called Iran "a rogue regime" and a "radical theocracy" and stated unequivocally that the United States "cannot tolerate a nuclear Iran" because Iranian nuclear weapons would endanger Israel and provoke a regional arms race.  Obama has refused to rule out the possible use of force against Iran, and even when he has called for diplomacy, he has stressed that it must be accompanied by tightened sanctions against the regime in Tehran.

 

McCain recommends a similar policy approach to Iran.  He has argued that although the threat of military action must remain on the table, it is not "the preferred option."  He recommends putting pressure on Iran through tougher international sanctions, if necessary through a "League of Democracies" that would bypass the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto in the U.N. Security Council.

 

BACKGROUND

 

Iran’s oil wealth and military capabilities have guaranteed its strategic relevance in the region.  Iran's ties with Hamas, Hezbollah and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq allow Tehran to influence political developments in the Arab world.  The elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 also removed Iran's longstanding regional rival and facilitated the spread of Iranian influence in Iraq and other countries across the Middle East.

U.S.-Iranian relations have been troubled for decades, although the rivalry has intensified in recent years.  Since the Iranian Revolution – which transformed Iran from a monarchy to an Islamic republic -- and the hostage crisis of 1979 – where Iranian militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran -- Washington and Tehran have had no formal diplomatic ties.  Under the Bush Administration, U.S.-Iranian tensions have increased, and both Washington and Tehran have stepped up their rhetoric against each other.   In President Bush's 2002 State of the Union speech, he named Iran as a member of the "Axis of Evil" along with Iraq and North Korea, while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has fiercely criticized the United States and its support for Israel.  The United States and Iran have also clashed over Tehran’s ties with Hamas and Hezbollah, its support for Shi’ite militias in Iraq, and a variety of other issues.

Most worrying of all to the United States is the progress of Iran’s nuclear program.  Although the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Tehran had halted the military portion of its nuclear program in late 2003, Iran has continued to enrich uranium and move closer to a nuclear capability.  The NIE warned that at a minimum, Iran is keeping open the option of restarting its weapons program.  Some observers believe that by the time the next President takes office, Iran may be only months away from producing a nuclear device.  The threat of nuclear weapons in Iranian hands has raised the possibility of U.S. military action against Iran. 

ANALYSIS

Both candidates are likely to find the military option unattractive for several reasons.  Iran's nuclear program is spread out among a number of facilities, some of which (such as the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz) are underground or hardened against attack, so it would be difficult to eliminate the entire program with a single air strike like the Israeli operation that destroyed the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981.  A longer bombing campaign or ground invasion, on the other hand, would be costly and could place additional burdens on the American military, already under strain as a result of the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

A U.S. attack on Iran could also endanger U.S. interests elsewhere in the Middle East.  Iran might increase the flow of weapons into Iraq and encourage its Iraqi proxies to target U.S. troops, and it could push Hezbollah and Syria to stir up further unrest against the U.S.-backed Siniora government in Lebanon.  Iran’s position near the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz could allow it to disrupt the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the rest of the world in the event of war.  A U.S. strike on Iran could also spark international opposition, including criticism from traditional American allies.


But if open conflict between the United States and Iran is unlikely over the next four years, so is a major diplomatic breakthrough.  Even if Iran does not pursue its nuclear program further, a number of other issues divide Tehran and Washington, including Iranian ties with Hezbollah and the Syrian regime and the Iranian regime’s treatment of religious minorities and domestic political opponents.  Ahmadinejad’s  inflammatory rhetoric against Israel has also harmed Iran’s image in the United States and could hinder a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.  Iran’s domestic political structure is also rather complex and opaque to outside observers, and even if the Iranian regime decides to improve relations with the United States, conservative elements within the government and the Shi’ite clergy could act to block such a move.  Anything as far-reaching as full normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations should not be expected under the next administration.


These constraints will limit the ability of the next administration to achieve dramatic changes in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  The most likely outcome is something similar to what has occurred under the Bush administration -- there will be limited U.S.-Iranian negotiations (through intermediaries if necessary) over issues such as Iran's nuclear program and its policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but these negotiations will often be accompanied by harsh rhetoric and public hostility on both sides.


In fact, much of the initiative in the U.S.-Iranian relationship may not lie with Washington at all.  If Iran succeeds in constructing and testing a nuclear device in the next four years, it could spark a major new diplomatic or military crisis with the United States.  On the political front, Amhadinejad will be up for reelection in June 2009, and the tone of U.S.-Iranian relations may change if he does not win a second term.  There is also the possibility that Israel may choose to act on its own to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program, although Tel Aviv would be unlikely to launch a strike without Washington's approval or at least acquiescence.  U.S.-Iranian relations could well be affected more by these events than by any decision the next administration makes on its own.

 

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Victor McFarland is a PhD student in the Department of History at Yale University, where he studies 20th-century U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

 

Rebuilding Alliances and Managing Expectations in a Post-Bush World

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DEVELOPMENTS

The next U.S. President will inherit a complex and dangerous set of foreign policy challenges: wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a global financial crisis, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, instability in Pakistan, and competition from emerging powers like China, India, and a resurgent Russia.  In its special coverage of the U.S. presidential election, The Economist describes the foreign policy environment as “the most difficult international situation since 1968.”  Moreover, the next President will have to manage these issues at a time when America's economic power is in decline, its military resources are overstretched, and its ability to win sympathy or support from allies has been severely diminished.  The American public is also likely to be preoccupied with the economic crisis and related troubles at home, making it even more difficult for the next President to pursue an internationalist agenda. 

Despite these pressures, the campaigns of both Senator McCain and Senator Obama have continued to emphasize the need for robust defense and national security policies.  But they are likely to need all the help they can get.  Material and political support from allies will be essential for pursuing solutions to global problems like climate change or nuclear proliferation, for supporting the spread of freedom and prosperity in the world, and for credibly projecting strength in the face of dangerous threats.  Europe's common values and shared interests – not to mention its economic clout and, in some places, political influence – make it a natural ally and invaluable partner to the U.S.

 

BACKGROUND

The transatlantic partnership has been strained under the Bush Administration, primarily by disagreement over the Iraq war, but also by broader perceptions of the Administration's contempt for international institutions and flaunting of international law.  Like much of the world, Europe has been following the 2008 presidential election with great interest.  Opinion polls consistently show that if Europeans could vote in American elections, the outcome would favor Senator Obama by a wide margin.  Yet, whether it is Senator McCain or Senator Obama who wins the White House, the next President will benefit from at least a degree of European goodwill simply because he is not George W. Bush.  According to the German Marshall Fund of the United States' annual Transatlantic Trends survey, expectations are much higher that relations will improve under a President Obama, whereas a McCain Administration would likely represent a continuation of the status quo.  Ironically, however, Senator McCain has a long history of pro-Atlanticism, and as a candidate he has supported several of the changes to U.S. policy that Europeans are most eager to see, including closing Guantanamo Bay and embracing climate change as a priority.  For either candidate, but particularly for Obama, the greatest challenge will be to find a way to signal a desire to renew the transatlantic relationship while at the same time managing Europe's very high expectations.

ANALYSIS

Given the conflicts and threats the next President will inherit, relations with Europe do not top either candidate's foreign policy agenda.  Yet both platforms do state a commitment to repairing the alliance and, more generally, to restoring America's standing in the world.  As President, both Senator McCain and Senator Obama can be expected to seek improved relations with Europe, and both can do so fairly credibly.  They both support a cap-and-trade system to address carbon emissions, and both would ban torture and close Guantanamo Bay.  There are also a few policy areas on which the Republican and Democratic candidates agree, but diverge from European opinion.  Both candidates will want Europe to step up its military and financial contributions to shared security goals, particularly the NATO mission in Afghanistan.  Like most American politicians, Senators McCain and Obama are both viewed by Europe as being biased in their approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

There are important differences between the candidates as well, and these were made clear by their respective responses to the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia.  These responses were indicative of broader differences in the candidates' approaches to foreign policy, with Obama’s calls for restraint by both sides and advocacy of a negotiated outcome contrasting with McCain's immediate condemnation of Russia and calls for its isolation by the international community.  Obama later also sharpened his tone, judging the scope of Russian's military action a clear encroachment on Georgia's sovereignty, though he continued to advocate a multilateral mediation effort.  McCain has called for Russia's expulsion from the G-8 group of industrialized nations; he also responded to the recent conflict by underscoring his support for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.  By contrast, Obama prefers missile defenses that are developed through multilateral consultation and takes the official position that he would support them if “based on sound technology that works […] rather than rushing unilaterally to deploy an unproven system.  It should also be noted that Europe itself was divided on its response to the Russia-Georgia conflict, with the former Warsaw Pact countries rushing to display solidarity with Georgia and countries like Germany and Italy that are dependent on Russian energy supplies showing much more caution.

Transatlantic relations will also be shaped by U.S. actions in other parts of the world.  Just as the Iraq war soured relations under President Bush, perceptions of unilateralism or bellicosity toward Iran or Russia, for example, will discourage Europeans from cooperating on these and other issues.  Here, McCain's hawkishness stands in stark contrast to Obama's expressed support for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq within 16 months and his willingness to engage in direct diplomacy with Iran.  

Overall, taking into account the similarities and differences between two candidates, it is not only the policy details that matter.  The risk of disappointment may run higher, but Obama's immense popularity with European publics will make it that much easier for their governments to be seen cooperating with the United States.  Given Obama's more measured responses to international conflict and the multilateralist tendencies expressed in his worldview, Europe is simply likely to be more sympathetic – and more responsive to – a President Obama.  

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Annie Verderosa is Foreign Policy Digest's Regional Editor for Europe/Russia.

 

Nukes in North Korea

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Reuters: Korea News Service

DEVELOPMENTS

On October 12th, 2008, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee said although US and Korean intelligence services estimate that although North Korea’s president, Kim Jong Il, exercises control over his administration, Kim's health has "significant implications for the security of the Korean peninsula." Kim's health issues make strikingly clear the urgent need for a clear timeline for denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and restoration of the US-North Korea relationship.  Kim's demise may result in an unpredictable leadership running a significantly destabilized North Korea, which currently possesses enough plutonium for 8 to 12 nuclear weapons.

In January, either John McCain or Barack Obama will shape a new course for US-North Korea relations.  Both candidates agree that there is a need for verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, but their speeches on the campaign trail suggest they may have divergent approaches.  Sen. Obama has said he is willing to meet "unconditionally" with leaders such as Kim Jong Il, a point McCain has repeated on the campaign trail to buttress the criticism that Obama may be inexperienced in foreign affairs.  McCain, on the other hand, has stated that he believes in diplomacy but will not meet with Kim Jong Il and has reportedly exhibited hostile sentiments toward the North Korean leader.  Given the uncertainty of North Korea's domestic political situation tense state and the strained state of US-North Korea relations, how will each candidate affect the current state of US-North Korea relations and the North Korean nuclear problem?
 

BACKGROUND

North Korea recently agreed to demands to US nuclear inspection – a measure that the State Department rewarded by removing the long-time 'axis of evil' state from its list of terrorist countries.  Though these steps represent modest gains in the troubled US-North Korean relationship, the need for complete and verifiable denuclearization is clear, especially in light of the North Korean leader's recent health issues.

Despite Kim's history of iron-fisted autocratic rule and erratic behavior, many Korean watchers point out Kim remains one of the most stable and predictable elements in North Korea. "The devil we know is less dangerous than the devil we don't know," said Ambassador Donald Gregg, former  U.S. ambassador to South Korea during the George H.W. Bush administration, referring to the reality that there is currently no succession scenario in place if Kim dies.  Some Korea watchers, such as Dr. Samuel Kim of Columbia University, have suggested that any power struggle following Kim's demise is likely to result in an even more hard line leadership in North Korea.  The most pressing danger, however, is that in the event of Kim's death, it is unclear who will be in charge of North Korea's arsenal of nuclear material and possible weapons. Wendy Sherman, a former high ranking member of the United States Department of State under President Clinton, said of the rumors of Kim's deteriorating health: "Uncertainty in North Korea reminds us that having nuclear material and possible weapons not fully secured or known about increases the risk to the entire international community."

Given the potentially frail state of Kim, the next stage of American policy toward North Korea will have to emphasize the possibility of negotiating with North Korea without Kim Jong Il.  Both candidates have said that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is necessary but appear to disagree on approach.  Obama has articulated his willingness to sit down with the North Korean leader.  Ambassador Donald Gregg, foreign policy advisor to the Obama campaign, stated at a recent forum that Obama would support the signing of a peace treaty formally ending war on the Korean peninsula and the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations would be a major step forward.  According to Gregg, Obama has said he would support joint economic projects such as Kaesong Economic Zone, which provide employment opportunities for North Korean military which would be expected to be scaled back at the DMZ.  These developments would likely ease tension, build trust, and eventually pave the way for discussion of human rights issues, including the unequal food distribution in the country and the treatment of North Korean citizens and political prisoners.

McCain has stated that he is not willing to sit down unconditionally with leaders such as Kim Jong Il, citing the leader's numerous human rights violations against his own people.  In a Wall Street Journal op-ed co-written with Sen. Joe Lieberman, Sen. McCain took a jab at Kim Jong Il, writing, "we must never squander the trust of our allies and the respect for our highest office by promising that the president will embark on an open-ended, unconditional personal negotiation with a dictator responsible for running an international criminal enterprise, a covert nuclear weapons program and a massive system of gulags." Speaking on McCain's behalf, New York State campaign chairman Edward Cox has stated that McCain understands the importance of diplomatic discussions but suggested during a recent presidential candidates forum that the Arizona senator harbors suspicion about the North Korean leader's intentions: "What is the real interest that Kim Jong Il is trying to promote here -- does he want to bribe a little bit more hard currency away from countries around him and if it is, how do we deal?"
 

ANALYSIS

North Korea has not been an explicit focus of either presidential campaign thus far, but the window for effective diplomacy and negotiation may be closing rapidly, particularly as Kim Jong Il's health is reportedly deteriorating and there is no succession scenario in place.  The North Korean nuclear threat has been overshadowed by pressing domestic issues on the campaign trail and is unlikely to become a big talking point in the remaining weeks of the campaign. Unfortunately, the candidate who takes office may find himself negotiating with a much more unpredictable and dangerous North Korea.

Jung Hwa Song is a journalist in New York City. She received her A.B. from Princeton University and has conducted extensive field research
on Sino-North Korean relations.

 

 

Can Latin America Weather a Global Recession?

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The above chart illustrates the extent of financial globalization over the past two decades. The line in red illustrates the rest-of-world (ROW) assets in the U.S., while the blue line illustrates the U.S. assets in other countries as a percentage of rest-of-world (ROW) GDP. The high degree of financial globalization between the U.S. and the rest of the world show how difficult is for the rest of the world to avoid the contagion of the U.S. financial crisis. (Caption by Adam Benz, graphic courtesy of New York Times website.)

DEVELOPMENTS

Latin America has a long history of disastrous financial meltdowns, which over the past twenty years include its largest economies, such as Mexico in 1994, Argentina in 2001, and Brazil in 1999. Those crises devastated financial institutions and created tremendous social instability, pushing many members of the middle class into poverty. Much like the current U.S. financial crisis, many of Latin America’s previous crises were the product of risky growth-centric economic policies and inadequate fiscal protections. As a result, many Latin American nations have enacted a wide range of important economic reforms over the past few decades, sometimes reluctantly in the face of pressure from international financial institutions. Moreover, in recent years several important countries have willingly pursued prudent financial policies that emphasize stable sustainable growth and include a number of protections from future crises.

 

Financial reforms enacted by some Latin American governments earned the region a newfound reputation for fiscal responsibility; the reputation was so strong that a growing consensus emerged amongst prominent analysts that Latin America might prove far more resilient to an economic downturn in the U.S. than ever before. There was even speculation that growing domestic consumer spending, ample foreign reserves, and blossoming trade with China and other emerging economies in countries such as Chile, Brazil and Mexico might have allowed them to “decouple” from the U.S. economy by developing enough independent economic strength to withstand a U.S. financial downturn.

Nevertheless, recent declines in Latin American stock markets and commodity prices have made it clear that Latin America’s newfound fiscal responsibility cannot fully insulate the region as a whole from the effects of the U.S. financial crisis. However, those countries that hold fewer foreign reserves and engaged in riskier policies in the pursuit of rapid growth remain far likelier to experience economic turmoil in the event of a global recession. 

Argentina, for instance, is especially vulnerable.  It has been widely accused of manipulating government statistics under President Christina Fernandez de Kirchner to hide double-digit inflation, while its high export taxes make its agricultural industry a mainstay of its troubled economy. While Argentina’s administration has recently made belated overtures to foreign investors to provide the country with much needed capital, this action may prove too little too late as foreign investors become increasingly wary of risk. The same holds true of Bolivia, where moves by President Evo Morales to nationalize key industries has frozen investment, making his ambitious agenda of wealth redistribution more difficult to accomplish.

Venezuela also is at high risk of economic turmoil, given that many of President Hugo Chavez’s government policies have discouraged both foreign and domestic investment, which has had the effect of making the country dependent on foreign imports for most goods, including basic food products. While Chavez’s government currently has sufficient foreign reserves and can rely on high oil prices to cushion its economy, it already suffers from rampant inflation, and a continued drop in oil prices caused by a global recession could be disastrous to Venezuela’s financial soundness.

Countries that have implemented plans to avoid the financial crises of decades past are in far safer positions. Chile is especially well positioned to weather a potential global economic storm. Rather than spend  most of its windfall from high copper prices, Chile has set aside billions of dollars to maintain important government expenditures during times of economic downturn or low commodity prices. President Michelle Bachelet, a socialist, has been harshly criticized domestically and by global economists for not spending more over the past decade while the global economy was booming; however, her cautious approach now seems likely to pay off in providing Chile with needed protection during a global decline.

Likewise, Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy, had been accused for years of being a laggard among the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) group of major global emerging economies for pursuing economic stability at the expense of more rapid growth. However, as a result of its policies, the country now enjoys low inflation, high domestic spending from an expanded middle class, over 200 billion in foreign reserves, and a booming commodities export industry that is more competitive and therefore less vulnerable than many of its neighbors.

Both Chile and Brazil also benefit from their relative independence from U.S. trade in comparison to Mexico, which, despite important reforms under President Felipe Calderón, is likely to suffer from a loss of U.S. trade and a drop in remittances from Mexican nationals in the U.S.  

ANALYSIS

As wealthy nations in North America, Europe and elsewhere face what many worry may be their worst economic recession since the Great Depression, the fact that some large Latin American economies have an opportunity to continue to grow in the coming years may become a benefit for the rest of the world. Unlike during the 1930s, Brazil and the other BRIC economies are already emerging as important engines of global economic growth, a trend that may be accelerated by the current downturn among developed economies worldwide. BRIC economies already constitute 14% of the world’s economic output, while emerging economies have counted for more than half of the world’s GDP since 2005, which has not happened since the industrial era first began. Absent a return to economic protectionism similar to that which occurred during the Great Depression, growth in these economies may help spur growth in developed economies such as the U.S. as well, thereby helping to mitigate the impact of a global recession. Changes to the global economy brought about by the rise of these emerging economies may prove useful in helping the U.S. recover from the economic damage started at home.

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Adam Benz is Regional Editor for Foreign Policy Digest for the Americas.