DEVELOPMENTS

At the end of 2007, countries who signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) started a two-year process to draft a new climate change agreement, to be completed and signed at the December 2009 meeting of climate negotiators in Copenhagen, Denmark.  The start of agreement negotiations closely followed a report by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) announcing that countries would have to end their growth in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by no later than 2015 to avoid the potentially disastrous effects of raising the earth’s average surface temperature in 2000 by more than 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit.

As reported by the IPCC, climate change is a global problem. Worldwide GHG emissions continue to rise despite national and regional reduction efforts.  When the first commitment period under the Kyoto protocol ends in 2012, there will be no international legal obligation to reduce emissions unless the Copenhagen Agreement enters into force the same year.  With no alternative to Copenhagen under negotiation, the deadline to stabilize emissions as identified by the IPCC rapidly approaching, and the accelerating negative effects of climate change, many experts and international non-governmental organizations consider Copenhagen the international community’s last chance to contain the potentially severe effects of climate change.  

Of the regions most likely to be affected by a catastrophic rise in average worldwide temperature, Arab-majority states stretching from Morocco to Iraq will especially suffer depletions of their water and agricultural resources.  But interest among Arab states in the Copenhagen process is mixed.  OAPEC countries (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have a history of engaged involvement in the negotiations. Egypt and Morocco, two non-OAPEC countries, have increased their engagement after realizing the national security effects of climate change.  However, other Arab states like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and others do not consider climate change a priority, and so far have not developed or submitted any national position on the different topics under negotiation in the lead up to Copenhagen.

BACKGROUND

The UNFCCC establishes a framework to address global climate change in part by stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to avoid "dangerous anthropogenic interference" with the climate system. It entered into force on 21 March 1994, after the requisite 50 countries ratified it. The Convention now has 186 parties, approaching universal membership among nation states.

The Arab World has played a strong role in shaping climate policy since the establishment of the UNFCCC, much to the consternation of emissions reducing countries. Oil-exporting Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, with relatively well-funded  delegations, have exerted their influence through membership in country groups, including the League of Arab States, OAPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and G-77 plus China. Consequently, the OAPEC position on the current climate negotiations is completely in line with the Saudi position, a position adopted in full by the League of Arab States.  The Climate Change Performance Index, which  ranks 57 industrialized countries and emerging economies according to the quality of their climate policy, has consistently ranked Saudi Arabia last.

Like Saudi Arabia, oil-reliant OAPEC countries see the fight against climate change as a direct threat to their oil trade and strategic political power.  Fossil fuels, like oil, are considered the primary cause of climate change, and reducing GHG emissions is mainly focused on introducing renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency. Although there are no clear estimates of how climate change mitigation will impact the oil trade, any requirements that encourage switching to a low-carbon economy are likely to reduce demand for oil worldwide, unfavorably affecting OAPEC economies. Anticipating these adverse effects, OAPEC countries have advocated since the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol that oil producing countries receive compensation for losses to the oil trade sustained because of climate change policies.   

Leading this campaign for OAPEC countries at each round of negotiations has been the Saudi delegation, headed by Saudi Ministry of Petroleum official Mohammad El-Sabban, head of delegation since the 1990s. To the extent that several international environmental groups and research institutes see them as deliberate obstructers of the climate negotiation process, the Saudi delegates have struggled to insert the provisions they most desire into the agreements that have been ratified to date.

  Climate policy experts argue that changes in climate policy under President Obama and the enduring political influence of the U.S. on Saudi Arabia will convince the Kingdom to change its climate policy.  They argue that Saudi Arabia assumed an obstructionist role in the climate negotiations only because the Bush administration let it. But such hopes, like their rationales, are not necessarily well-placed. Under the Clinton administration, which, unlike that of George W. Bush, favored a strong climate treaty, Saudi Arabia lobbied for a weak agreement.  Even in its latest text submission to the UNFCCC secretariat on February 2 to comment on long-term cooperative action, Saudi Arabia reiterated their request for financial compensation for any impact on the oil trade due to action against climate change. During the last UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Poznan, they also tried to include response measures under the adaptation fund, which was created to help poor countries adapt to the direct effects of climate change.  Therefore, Saudi Arabia will likely reprise its obstructionist role in this crucial year for Copenhagen.

ANALYSIS

Knowing that the Obama administration has identified climate change as one of its top priorities, special attention needs to be given to the Arab region.  The UNFCCC decides issues by  unanimous consensus: a determined member state can derail, weaken, or delay the decision making process.   Having less than a year to deal with a long list of agenda items and reach a climate deal in December, the Obama Administration, working with other parties to the negotiation, should ensure Saudi Arabia and the rest of OAPEC do not hinder progress.  Here are a few ways the Obama Administration may achieve this goal:

1. Launch bilateral U.S.-Saudi climate policy talks.  The U.S. has relatively ignored Saudi Arabia on climate change.  Being its strongest ally, the U.S. could affect the Kingdom’s climate policy, especially if it offers the Saudis significant economic guarantees to offset potentially harmful short-term shocks to the oil trade.
2. Emphasize threats to water and food security in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Rights to water resources will be part of the negotiations, and climate change will affect those rights.  Emphasizing their prominence in the negotiations will improve regional awareness of climate change’s national security implications.
3. Increase the capacity of UNFCCC negotiating teams in non-oil producing Arab states to offset Saudi Arabian dominance of the regional debate. Capacity-building initiatives such as negotiation trainings and climate policy workshops are relatively inexpensive, and would require redirecting a relatively small amount of aid already earmarked by the US Government for the region.  Climate change will affect non-oil producing countries in the Middle East/North Africa region, and it is in their national interest to balance the to-date outsize influence of Saudi Arabia in representing the region’s interests at the climate negotiations.

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Wael Hmaidan is executive director and a co-founder of IndyACT, and the head of the ‘Arab Climate Campaign’ in the organization. The campaign aims at achieving a strong post-2012 climate policy in the Arab region. He also established the Arab Climate Alliance to push strong climate policy through the League of Arab States. Wael has more than ten years experience in climate change campaigning in the Arab World. His work on this issue started in his capacity as the Greenpeace campaigner for the Arab World, where he helped establish the energy and climate change campaign in the region. He participated as an Arab World climate policy expert in several regional and international climate negotiations.

DEVELOPMENTS

From March 16^th to March 22^nd, representatives from private industry and international organizations, activists, and government officials – in sum a record-breaking 28,000 participants – attended the Fifth World Water Forum in Istanbul, co-hosted by The World Water Council and the Turkish government. The Forum assembles every three years since its first convening in 1997 to address the affects and effects of population growth, climate change, pollution, and flooding on the world’s water resources. The forum was open to the public and featured a Virtual Meeting Space to allow those interested in water issues to share information and debate issues with others from around the world. The Forum also coincided with the release of the third edition of the United Nations World Water Development Report.  

This year’s Forum focused on how the international credit crunch has hindered the progress of water and sanitation projects in developing nations, a theme of interest to countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), parts of which in 2008 experienced their worst drought in recent history. Water shortages in the MENA region continue to pose public health challenges and foment major regional conflict.  

The Forum did not transpire without criticism from attendees and non-attendees alike. Forum critics claimed the conference was nothing more than a trade show for private industry seeking to privatize water resources. Others, citing the cost of registration, starting at 240 Euros for developing country participants, said the Forum was not easily accessible to all stakeholders. Activists staged protests outside the Forum, which resulted in violent clashes with riot police, arrests and deportations.  Other critics staged an Alternative Forum to represent the needs of rural poor, the environment and organized labor.

DEVELOPMENTS 

Abdel-Magid Mohammed has had a busy two weeks.  On April 8th, Mohammed, who is Egypt’s public prosecutor, announced he and his staff were interrogating fifty operatives detained on Egyptian soil for allegedly spying for Hizbullah and conspiring to destabilize the Egyptian state.  As details of the operatives’ intent emerged, and the number charged with spying for Hizbullah narrowed from fifty to nine, the flames of political discord between Arab powers were fanned.  Though the arrests occurred months before, their public revelation now has heightened tensions between Shiite Hizbullah, its patron Shiite state Iran, and Sunni Egypt.

The claims against the detained Hizbullah operatives are concerning to the Egyptian government not just because of the inherent Sunni-Shiite tension, but equally if not moreso because of what they suggest about the ambitions of Hizbullah, and by proxy Iran, for the Red Sea region.  Hizbullah claims its operatives in Egypt were merely present to support Gazan Palestinians. Yet Egypt has accused the detained operatives of recruiting members on behalf of Hizbullah in Egypt to target Israeli tourists. More broadly, at least one analyst asserts that Hizbullah operatives in Egypt seek to install an “infrastructure of violence” in the Red Sea through operations that target Suez Canal traffic and destabilize Egyptian towns bordering the Sinai and crossing to the Gaza Strip.

 DEVELOPMENTS

Afghanistan’s history is a complex and violent one marked by a series of foreign evasions and occupations. The twentieth century history of Afghanistan is highlighted by its gaining independence from Great Britain in 1919, the Soviet Union invasion in 1979 followed by a lengthy proxy war with U.S. backed mujahedin forces.

For all intents and purposes the conflict forced the Soviet Union to withdraw in 1989 amid heavy losses of men, equipment and more importantly it saddled the Soviet Union with a huge financial investment that they could ill-afford when coupled with its crumbling domestic situation.

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, the United States invaded and in the process drove the Taliban out of power and further East to the border with Pakistan. This also had the effect of forcing Al-Qaeda to take refuge in the mountains and hills in that region. The Taliban fighters that chose to remain are now engaging the United States and its allies in a costly and deadly counterinsurgency that has made rehabilitation increasingly difficult.

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation estimates that the United States has spent 177.5 billion USD on Afghanistan since the United States invaded in 2001. One of many dilemmas that the United States faces in Afghanistan is bolstering a government that many Afghans see as corrupt. Another is the effort to phase out poppy cultivation as the crop of choice which in-turn fuels a global hunger for heroin and puts money into the pocket of the Taliban which in-turn fuels their insurgent efforts against coalition forces. Finally, the United States must turn around a failed state so that it can be functional on the international stage.

All of this is feasible in the log run but an important component of this will be education. Education is the key to Afghanistan’s future.