DEVELOPMENTS

On January 23rd, justice caught up to Congolese warlord General Laurent Nkunda.  The leader of the Tutsi militia which caused nearly 200,000 deaths in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was arrested by Rwandan soldiers, some of which were former allies. Nkunda joins other African warlords including Charles Taylor, Thomas Lubanga and Jean-Pierre Bemba, now in custody. The United Nations and Western countries request that these and other war criminals face justice at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In recent months, a number of warrants, arrests, and prosecutions have provided African countries with an opportunity to test the international criminal legal regime.  But these countries still retain the option of prosecuting the captured domestically, and this choice introduces new challenges. Where should they be prosecuted if their atrocities were committed in multiple countries? What remedy will their prosecution provide to victims?  How should their trials be conducted without emboldening their loyalists?  Should kidnapped child soldiers be given amnesty in all cases? Answers to these questions must weigh the interests of justice and peace, a challenge made more difficult when the two seem incompatible.

BACKGROUND

General Nkunda was regarded as guardian of the Congolese Tutsi people in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which 800,000 Tutsis were murdered by Hutu militas. Although Nkunda is Congolese, he declared in 2005 that the DRC government was corrupt and subsequently pledged his allegiance to the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Until recently he had the support of the Tutsi-led Rwandan government. But in October 2008, the schoolteacher turned militia-leader led a brutal rebel offensive against civilians in North Kivu. Human Rights Watch reports that General Nkunda committed war crimes and human rights abuses by ordering summary executions, torture and rape.

International pressure on Rwandan President Kagame to reign in Nkunda reached its peak this month.  Rather than continue to support Nkunda, Kagame sent 4,000 Rwandan troops to the Congo to capture his former ally. Nkunda is currently being detained somewhere in Rwanda, but the Congolese government has requested his extradition to try him before a Congolese military.  But the Rwandan president has not indicated whether he plans to hand Nkunda over to the DRC.  To date, there is no evidence that the Rwandan and Congolese government have come to any agreement over what to do with Nkunda.  In the meantime, Tutsi protesters in Rwanda are calling for Nkunda’s release while international NGOs, like Amnesty International, demand that Nkunda be prosecuted by the ICC. President Kagame must decide what to do with Nkunda, knowing that the wrong decision could destabilize the region.  If Kagame releases Nkunda, Rwanda will likely lose credibility and international standing.  If he decides to detain the general indefinitely, Kagame will exacerbate an already tense relationship with the DRC.  And even if the Rwandan government sought to turn Nkunda over to the ICC (which may be an option in the near future) protest by Nkunda supporters could grow violent and embolden Nkunda’s supporters.

The Ugandan government faces a similar situation with Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony.  Kony has led the LRA to commit brutal attacks on the Acholi people of northern Uganda.  He has allegedly kidnapped thousands of children to serve as soldiers in the LRA, some of which were forced to murder their parents.  For the time being Kony has been hiding in Garamba National Park in eastern DRC.  The ICC issued a warrant for Kony’s arrest in 2005, but without a police or military force of their own, the ICC has no way of capturing him.  Ugandan President Museveni has even considered bargaining with Kony to get him surrender.  Last summer’s Peace and Reconciliation deal would have permitted Kony to escape ICC prosecution in return for surrendering to the Ugandan authorities and submitting to traditional justice mechanisms.  Whether it is worth it to sacrifice justice for peace is up to the Ugandan president to decide, but leaders in Rwanda and DRC will be watching closely to learn from his success or failure.

ANALYSIS

International law outlines fundamental human rights and establishes a judicial system for those who violate those rights in the form of international tribunals.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are two recent examples of high profile tribunals investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. But these tribunals are not responsible for piecing the victim countries back together.  Post-conflict resolution and political reconciliation are problems for state governments to solve on their own and international law gives little guidance in that respect. 

In 2009, a growing number of African countries will have to determine what to do with their captured warlords and human rights abusers. As the trials of Liberia’s former President Charles Taylor and Thomas Lubanga (another Congolese warlord and the first person to stand trial before the ICC) continue, information will come to light which will undoubtedly lead to more warrants, arrests and prosecution. While government leaders in the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda wrestle with these decisions, Sudan may also join the group, as the ICC prosecutor will likely issue a warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir before the year’s end.  Even among these warring countries, cooperation could yield a model that fosters lasting peace while holding accountable perpetrators of the worst human rights abuses.

DEVELOPMENTS

The Obama presidency begins at a time of great challenge and great opportunity in the Middle East.  Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons, U.S. relations with Syria have deteriorated, the Lebanese government is weak and fractured, and the conflict between Israel and Hamas threatens to exacerbate regional instability. However, the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan have become U.S. allies, the Persian Gulf states have deepened their ties with the U.S., and have committed to fighting terrorism and developing, democratic institutions—all of which makes possible a major strategic realignment in the region that would favor U.S. interests.

Although President Obama campaigned on general denunciations of President Bush’s foreign policy record, he will need to overcome the temptation to overlook the opportunities the outgoing President forged. A successful regional approach requires not only a realistic threat assessment, but also an understanding of the U.S.’s considerable regional gains in the last eight years, and President Obama will have to devote as much attention to securing these gains as he will to confronting lingering threats. 

BACKGROUND

George W. Bush inherited a dangerous and volatile Middle East when he became president in 2001.  At President Bush’s first inauguration, collapsed Israeli-Palestinian peace talks had helped spark a second Intifada; Afghanistan was a terrorist sanctuary; Iraq was under the leadership of a violent, anti-American dictator; Iran had begun developing nuclear weapons; Libya was a state-sponsor of terrorism; Saudi Arabia was funding radical madrassas throughout the Middle East and using hate-mongering textbooks in its own schools; Syria occupied Lebanon; and Pakistani-U.S. relations were at best unclear, because of President Pervez Musharraf’s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Despite unresolved challenges with Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, and India-Pakistan, President Bush made substantial progress in a number of areas.  His decision to remove from power the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq turned two of the greatest threats to the U.S. into allies in the War on Terror, and likely helped convince Libya to renounce terrorism and abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in 2003.  President Bush also exerted pressure on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, pressed allies in the Persian Gulf and the Maghreb to develop democratic institutions and greater civil liberties, and deepened America’s ties with numerous countries in the region by signing free trade agreements. 

ANALYSIS

President Obama will have to devote attention to many pressing issues in the Middle East, such as stabilizing Lebanon, encouraging continued progress towards democracy in Morocco, Jordan, and several other Gulf countries, and managing unexpected crises that are certain to divert the new president and his Middle East team entirely.  However, President Obama would do well to focus his limited time and resources to the following five priorities—in descending order of importance:

1. Secure U.S. gains in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The U.S. has invested a great deal of blood and treasure in these two countries, and failure risks a loss of U.S. prestige as well as other long-lasting consequences.  Allies would no longer trust the U.S., enemies would no longer fear the U.S., and terrorist groups would establish safe-havens and spread chaos in both countries.  Meanwhile, success would tip the region’s strategic balance in America’s favor, set a powerful example for other countries in the Middle East, and deal a deathblow to al Qaeda, which would lose credibility and be unable to attract new recruits.
2. Counter Iran from a position of strength.  President Obama will have to persuade Iran that it should abandon its nuclear aims and become a more constructive member of the international community.  Thankfully, Iran’s bellicose rhetoric and pursuit of nuclear weapons is doing for the rest of the Middle East what the Soviet Union did for Europe: fostering greater cooperation among other countries in the region, and driving everybody deeper into the American camp.  If President Obama secures our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, and if the price of oil remains low, then the U.S. can approach Iran with unprecedented leverage.
3. Cooperate with Pakistan to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  Certain elements of the Pakistani government, military, and security services remain uncommitted to a successful Afghanistan.  These elements favor “strategic depth,” i.e., an unstable or Taliban-led Afghanistan into which Pakistani forces can retreat in the event of a conflict between Pakistan and India.  President Obama will have to work with President Zardari to sideline those elements and take decisive action against the FATA-based Taliban and al Qaeda units.  A failure to do so could unravel our efforts in Afghanistan, destabilize Pakistan, and allow al Qaeda cells to again threaten the U.S. and its allies.     
4. Develop creative approaches to deradicalize the region and bolster moderates.  Saudi Arabia’s schools continue to use textbooks that denigrate other religions, support for Hamas and Hezbollah remains strong (though al Qaeda’s popularity has declined), and Islamists have made gains in several elections.  President Bush was certainly right to argue that in the long-run, the only way to fully tackle this problem is for freedom, democracy, and prosperity to take hold in the region.  But these political developments may take years or decades to achieve.  In the meantime, to effectively promote economic, political, and democratic reform in the region, President Obama will have to evaluate the public diplomacy efforts of the Departments of Defense and State, and consider establishing a centralized office of public diplomacy to better coordinate efforts across all departments; make sure U.S. embassies are equipped to do effective public outreach; and reach out to Hollywood, U.S. universities, and other segments of the private sector. 
5. Engage more publicly in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.  It would be a mistake for President Obama to turn Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking into the central focus of his Middle East policy. However, the perception in the region that the U.S. devotes insufficient attention to the conflict, a perception which grew during the Bush administration, is damaging to U.S. interests. To counter this, President Obama's newly appointed envoy to the region, former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, should be sure to work closely with regional actors as he develops a plan to set the peace process back on track. 

Focusing on these strategic priorities will allow President Obama to make real, lasting progress in the Middle East over the next four years. 

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Alexander Benard is an attorney at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.  He has worked at the Department of Defense and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not intended to represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, Foreign Policy Digest.

DEVELOPMENTS

European leaders face a burgeoning inbox of new strategic challenges as 2009 begins. Addressing the fallout from the global economic crisis, working with the incoming Obama administration, and determining the future of NATO operations in Afghanistan are likely to be at the forefront of their collective consciousness. This year may also realize crucial opportunities for newly recognized threats to international security. In December, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will meet in Copenhagen to attempt to forge a new international agreement on climate change, as making headway on this issue likely to be high on European leaders’ agendas.

While these challenges have been fairly well documented, a more traditional security concern – strategic nuclear arms-control and non-proliferation – is likely to weigh heavily on leaders’ minds in 2009. In a throwback to the Cold War, a critical component of the framework that regulates nuclear weapons between Russia and the U.S. known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is set to expire in December 2009. No follow-up mechanisms have been agreed, and if START simply runs out there will no longer be measures in place for each side to openly monitor and inspect the other’s nuclear inventories. European leaders are wary that current tensions between Russia and the West – over the Georgia crisis, gas supplies, and missile defense – could continue to leave progress in the arena of nuclear cooperation stymied. This could potentially complicate wider non-proliferation efforts, particularly the situation surrounding Iran’s (ostensibly civil) nuclear program.

BACKGROUND

Arms control agreements, such as START, emerged in part as recognition on both the U.S. and Soviet sides of the crippling economic costs of nuclear ‘arms-racing.’ START, which entered into force in 1991, is an important treaty not only because it was the first to require the elimination of U.S. and Soviet - now Russian - nuclear weapons systems, but also because it allowed for intrusive monitoring. This level of transparency was previously unheard of in an area of such closely guarded national security interests.    

What would be the harm of letting START simply pass into the night? In a Wall Street Journal commentary from January 2008, an esteemed group of former U.S. Secretaries of State outlined a compelling set of arguments as to why international treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation are still relevant. They argue that as access to nuclear technologies becomes more widespread, the threat of weapons proliferating to ‘rogue’ states or extremist groups increases; therefore, regulation and ultimately reduction has become even more important.

Yet under the Bush Administration, disarmament efforts took a backseat to policies that emphasized nuclear pre-eminence. To address the emerging proliferation threat, the Bush Administration augmented its deterrence capabilities through the development of new ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons and technologies like ballistic missile defenses.

The missile defense issue in particular has provoked a great deal of debate and controversy in Europe.  The theory is that forward-based tracking stations combining highly advanced radars and ground-based interceptor missiles would be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic. This would serve as a hedge against a “doomsday scenario”: a state such as Iran or Syria developing and choosing to launch a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile against U.S. assets or its regional allies.  

Yet many Europeans remain skeptical.  Aside from concerns over whether the technology actually works, they question whether the
threat that missile defense is designed to counter may even emerge in the foreseeable future.  Their main point of contention is that
deploying U.S. missile defense assets in Europe is A) unnecessary and B) unnecessarily provocative of Russia.  The U.S. has consistently
stated that missile defense is a purely defensive system.  However, Russia argues that the forward deployment of sophisticated
interceptors in Europe, specifically in Poland and the Czech Republic, intrudes upon its security. They have warned of a new arms race and have threatened a number of possible "retaliatory steps" including the deployment of short range missiles along its border.

ANALYSIS

In isolation, START’s expiration may seem like a benign matter with little in the way of obvious fallout – intelligence agencies may have to work a little harder to obtain information that was previously readily available. But the issue is connected to a wider set of security questions. Under START, President Reagan’s “trust, but verify” maxim holds true. Without START, or something comparable, a deficit of “verify” would occur at a time when “trust” is hard to come by. The Europeans are concerned looking forward that this could snowball into an increasingly unstable security situation. Whether a follow-on agreement can be reached over the next year is a matter of significant debate.

A ripple effect from this instability is undeniable. The international community tends to takes notice when the two countries that possess close to 95% of the nuclear weapons in existence dither over decisions on the future of these forces. If no agreement is reached, there is a danger that so-called ‘nuclear aspirants’ (read: Iran) would have even less motivation to abide by non-proliferation measures. Non-nuclear states could legitimately question why they should exercise restraint or adopt more rigorous controls over their civil nuclear programs when the nuclear-weapons states are treating their disarmament commitments with such apparent disdain.  

To help resolve such an impasse, there must be engagement on multiple levels. Bilateral talks need to be complemented by regional and multilateral actions. For example, on missile defense the NATO path could be explored – through existing forums such as the NATO-Russia Council. The Europeans can certainly play a role. What offers some hope is that, ironically, a catalyst in the past for breakthroughs in arms-control agreements between the U.S. and Russia has been a situation where trust is absent. START was conceived at the height of the Cold War when President Reagan was proposing the creation of a Strategic Defense Initiative or “Star Wars” missile defense system. Europe will be monitoring closely how the situation unfolds in 2009 in the hope that tense times can focus attention on the pressing need to achieve an outcome that enhances security in the region. 

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Paul Flach is an analyst with Kroll in New York. He previously worked for the UK Ministry of Defence in London and as a consultant to the Center for International Cooperation at NYU. He writes in an independent capacity.

DEVELOPMENTS

China has not been immune to the global economic downturn, but an influential report by the World Economic Forum now proclaims that China’s economic downturn may pose one of the biggest threats to the crippled world economy.  China now boasts the third largest economy in the world but is suddenly suffering from its lowest economic growth rates after five straight years of heated economic growth.  Its leaders worry that the sudden economic downturn may undermine their political legitimacy, which has hinged on China’s extraordinary economic growth.  Rising unemployment in the millions is stoking some of the greatest social unrest the country has seen since the Tiananmen protests in 1989.  In 2009, the Chinese government will focus on fixing its economy by stimulating domestic demand and growth, while ensuring employment to keep up with its growing population and maintain political stability. 

Social unrest resulting from mass unemployment poses a significant challenge for China’s leadership in 2009; top economic planner Zhang Ping has already said that "excessive bankruptcies and production cuts will lead to massive unemployment and stir social unrest."  Another researcher has also warned of “mass-scale social turmoil,” with the sobering forecast that China’s unemployment could be as high as 14 percent by next year.  Both President Hu Jintao and Communist Party’s Security Commissioner Zhou Yongkang have already issued warnings that protests must be contained.  The riots and protests which are mainly confined to China’s coastal export-dependent regions, may move inland as the economic damage starts to spread to other sectors. 

Light manufactures, for which China is known, such as small toys, shoes and electronics, have been especially hard hit, and the sudden shutdown of these factories has resulted in about 10 million jobs lost, primarily among migrant workers.

As bleak as China’s 2009 forecast looks now, experts remind us that China has yet to feel the full effects of the global economic meltdown.  According to World Bank estimates, China's growth will drop further to 7.5 percent in 2009; the country has not seen a rate this low since 1990.  But, one researcher of the World Economic Forum report has predicted an even “hard[er] landing” for China, estimating that economic growth could plummet to 6 percent. In December 2008, the World Bank reported in its China Quarterly Update that the impact of the global economic crisis on China's economy has been "manageable so far, but is expected to intensify." 

BACKGROUND

When China's economic growth wound down to a five-year-low of 9 percent in the third quarter of 2008, the government immediately announced a 586 billion dollar stimulus package to stimulate the domestic economy and restore confidence.  The package targeted ten areas of investment that focus mainly on building infrastructure and providing social welfare to encourage Chinese consumers and companies to spend more, thereby increasing domestic growth and demand.  Some economists, however, point out that infrastructure building takes time to pay off, and an effective stimulus plan will have to address the immediate social consequences of the downturn, such as the millions of layoffs which have resulted in rising incidences of mass protests – especially in the southern region, where thousands of export firms have been shutting down.  

The government will also be focused on stabilizing its exports sector as quickly as possible.  According to government numbers, exports account for up to 40 percent of China’s gross domestic product, and China’s economy has been devastated as the export sector has been battered by weakening global demand and rising costs.  In December, China’s exports were down for the second month in a row.  By contrast, just one year ago, China’s export machine appeared unstoppable, growing 20 to 30 percent.  HSBC economist Ma Xiaoping has predicted that China’s exports will be down as much as 20 percent in the next several months.

ANALYSIS

The global financial crisis is the first major blow to China’s miraculous economic growth and poses a significant governance challenge for its leadership.  The government will have to act quickly to quell protests and address mass unemployment, while taking measures that will help China’s long-term economic goals.  China hopes that its stimulus package will boost growth rates to 8 percent (the point at which the country can maintain sufficient employment for its population), but reports by the World Bank and World Economic Forum suggest that this may be unlikely.  China is a global producer, a creditor to other nations, and the biggest market in the world; it is important for China to maintain stable economic growth, not only for itself, but to help stabilize the world economy. 

_{courtesy of the WSJ Blog}

DEVELOPMENTS:

One region that may prove surprisingly significant during President Barack Obama’s administration, despite eight years of relative neglect, is Latin America, which provides 30% of U.S. imports and is a nexus of critical allies.  Obama stated his intention to increase the presence of the Foreign Service and Peace Corps, combat drugs via economic and social aid, and to meet face to face with Latin American leaders regarded as 'hard-line leftists.'

The new administration has several hurdles to address, however, particularly in Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico and Bolivia and must develop its relationship with rising power Brazil.  Both Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales, the respective presidents of Venezuela and Bolivia, have expelled U.S. ambassadors, while Cuba continues to hold U.S. political prisoners and Mexico is a major source of illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Latin America may not start out as the highest priority for the incoming administration, ranking just eighth on a list of top 10 global economic challenges for Obama, but it is certainly rising in consideration. 

BACKGROUND:

Over the past eight years the bulk of attention paid to Latin America by the Bush administration focused immoderately on countering militant leftists with threats of economic sanctions and aid  suspension. As many nations in the region attempt to stabilize their economic and social structures amidst political instability and violence, a gulf of misunderstanding has sprung up between them and Washington.

In Venezuela, the fervent anti-American rhetoric coming from President Hugo Chavez has only escalated. In September, Chavez expelled U.S. Ambassador Patrick Duddy and Colombian authorities have discovered files revealing Chavez's intention to pledge $300 million to the FARC terrorist insurgency fighting the Colombian government, a major U.S. ally, has also been supported by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. Bolivia’s President Morales, who is similarly estranged from the United States, threw out Bolivia's U.S. Ambassador after accusations of inciting protests. He also removed representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, alleging that they were conspiring against his presidency.

Venezuela's growing relationship with Iran and Russia and Chavez's intention to abolish presidential term limits are also developments to watch. Obama has announced his intention to meet the Venezuelan president without precondition but has also stated that sanctions should be initiated against any nation found to be supporting the FARC. Chavez has indicated a willingness to meet with the new American president.

Cuba poses a different challenge, with many Latin American leaders – including Bolivia's Morales - pushing for the trade embargo to be lifted and the nation's continued retention of U.S. political prisoners. Although relations between Washington and Havana are limited, President Raul Castro has made recent positive reforms and Obama has indicated that he will ease travel restrictions for Cuban Americans visiting family and allow unlimited monetary remittances. The embargo, however, will remain in place pending further developments. The incoming president will further push for the release of U.S. prisoners and, as with Chavez, is willing to meet with Castro face to face.

In Mexico, though President Felipe Calderon is a crucial U.S. ally, the primary concerns of an Obama administration will be the problem of addressing 12 million illegal immigrants and ongoing drug-related violence. The Merida Initiative, a multi-year plan to support counter-narcotics operations in Central America, had a budget of $500 million for Mexico in the 2008 fiscal year, and it is part of the new administration's plan to increase that investment. President Obama has put a heavy emphasis on prevention and prosecution, and stated the importance of securing the border. He has also pledged to fight illegal immigration through increased foreign aid and micro-financing for Mexican businesses. Obama will likely take a similar approach in Colombia, where the administration will utilize the Andean Counter-Drug Program to combat drug trafficking. 

Brazil poses more of an opportunity than a challenge. Under President Luiz Inacio 'Lula' da Silva, Brazil boasts thriving economic growth, major agricultural exports, and  growing global power.  It isleading Haitian peace-keeping efforts and holding Venezuela's anti-American agenda at bay. By strengthening relations with South-America's largest nation, the Obama administration will benefit from Brazil’s stable economy, recent offshore oil and gas discoveries, and successful production of cane-based ethanol, which stands in stark contrast to the unprofitable U.S. corn ethanol program. Perhaps, most importantly, in a region where leftist sentiment has grown, Brazil is leading Latin American regional efforts to economically integrate and create a Latin American Defense Council and may, indeed, prove a keystone for U.S. diplomacy in Latin America.  

ANALYSIS:

Although Barack Obama espouses a 'direct diplomacy' approach to foreign policy, it is yet unclear what his approach to the region will be, beyond a focus on social policies, economic assistance, and a willingness to meet with his antagonists face to face. Recently confirmed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted in her confirmation speech that the administration will "pursue a strategy of 'smart power'" that pushes diplomacy to the head of foreign policy.

Two issues of concern that may come to the forefront are President Obama’s relative inexperience in the region – he has never visited Latin America and has relatively few advisors for the area–and his relatively protectionist stance towards free trade. Obama has opposed CAFTA, NAFTA, and the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement amongst others and has vowed to protect American jobs from being "shipped overseas." The travel issue is easily fixed but the latter concern may prove more contentious to Latin American free-trade proponents. 

The new president's acknowledgment of a need to address the region and to move it higher on the U.S. list of priorities, however, is likely to be met with universal approval. After years of neglect in the foreign policy of previous U.S. administrations, there are increasingly hopeful indicators that it may be once again Latin America’s time to shine.

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Jaclyn Selby has worked as a regional geopolitical consultant (Intellibridge, CastleAsia) and consults for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and for a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency contractor.