While the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) officially ended in 2003, peace seems tenuous at best, and many victims are still awaiting justice. For some, the best chance for obtaining justice in a conflict that has claimed the lives of over 5.5 million people is through the prosecution of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Thousands of miles away from DRC, at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Netherlands, Lubanga is being tried for crimes related to the use of child soldiers, specifically conscripting, enlisting, and using children under the age of fifteen to participate in hostilities. Lubanga is the alleged founder and president of the armed group, Union des patriotes congolais (UPC). He is also the alleged Commander-in-Chief of the Forces patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo (FPLC).

On July 15, 2010, while the Defense was presenting its case, the ICC’s Trial Chamber I ordered Lubanga released, due to concerns about the ability to conduct a fair trial, following the Prosecution’s failure to implement the Chamber’s order to disclose certain information to the Defense team. The Appeals Chamber has since suspended the decision to release Lubanga, pending the Prosecution’s appeal. The Chamber cited concerns over the ability to resume the trial, should the suspect be released prior to the appellate decision.

 DEVELOPMENTS

In 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) held its first democratic elections in over 40 years. Four years later and exactly 50 fifty years since independence, the DRC has taken an unmistakable turn towards autocratic rule that could destabilize not only the country but the Central African region. The government has stifled the opposition; centralized decision-making into a closed coterie of advisors to the president, Joseph Kabila; and increased threats and attacks against journalists and civil society activists, as underscored by the early June murder of Floribert Chebeya, one of Africa’s most respected human rights defenders.

The next year and a half will be crucial for consolidating any democratic gains that Congo has made. Yet the signs so far are disconcerting. As required by the constitution, the government must hold elections by the end of 2011, but preparations are far behind schedule, making it unlikely that credible elections will be held by then. At the same time, the government has demanded that the United Nations mission in the DRC (known by its French acronym, MONUC) withdraw its entire 20,000-strong mission by late 2011, which would undermine the little security that country has gained in its volatile East.

In January 2011, south Sudan will hold a referendum to decide between continued unity with the north or independence. This event poses many important challenges for the Sudanese people, their neighbors, and the wider international community. A number of issues need to be resolved before the referendum, including sensitive questions of border demarcation and arrangements for sharing wealth from the oil located in the south and pumped out through the north. But perhaps the issue with the most serious potential humanitarian and human rights implications is the question of citizenship.

Negotiations between the parties on citizenship rights in a post-independence scenario are at the very early stages and no apparent consensus has emerged. Hundreds of thousands of “southerners,” as defined by the national referendum legislation, who were displaced to the north during the war, lack clarity on what their status will be in the event the country divides. Many of these displaced people have lived in the north for more than a decade and have raised families there. It is unclear whether they will be offered dual citizenship, citizenship in the south with residency in the north, a choice between different options, or no choice at all.

If no agreement between the parties emerges on citizenship issues, this group of people could potentially be vulnerable to forced expulsion, or even statelessness. Ambiguity about their future status alone could be enough to cause large numbers of people to move preemptively. Such scenarios are possible if political relations between north and south Sudan deteriorate significantly during the process of separation, as toying with the fate of this community, and similar communities of northerners in the south, will become an effective way for the parties to pressure and intimidate one another.

 DEVELOPMENTS

Walking the streets of Nairobi, Kenya, many visitors would be shocked by the changing social composition of this bustling capital. A colony of Great Britain until 1963, Kenya has recently opened Chinese schools, restaurants, and direct flights to China in order to capitalize on the nearly 50,000 ethnic Chinese in the country (other sources claim less). This statistic is not only isolated to Kenya. According to Xinhua, China's official news agency, as many as 750,000 Chinese are working and living in Africa.

China’s increasing foreign direct investment to Africa over the last four years helps explain this migration. While China claims that its financial information is a state secret, the United States Congressional Research Service postulates that China has given nearly 18 billion dollars in aid to Africa in 2007 alone – mainly in the infrastructure and natural resource extraction industries.

Beyond the increase in Chinese workers, such growing influence has also raised criticism. Many analysts note that China’s aid lacks transparency, does not promote democratic ideals, and is self-serving in China’s dominion over natural resources. But with the current global and economic climate, many African countries are more than eager to forge closer bonds with China and are equally fervent in their dismissal of Western concerns.